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JOHN H. FARRAR*
I. Introduction
This article discusses the meanings of "the new financial architecture" and "corporate
governance," the nature and impact of globalization, particularly on regionalism, and re-
form of national corporate laws. It reviews previous attempts to deal specifically with the
regulation of multinational and transnational corporations and examines the experience of
the European Union in integration of laws on corporate governance. Finally, it considers
the place of a broader concept of corporate governance in the new financial architecture,
including the emerging norms of global corporate governance, which are of an essentially
self-regulatory nature.
IH. The Need for a New Global Financial Architecture
and Effective Corporate Governance
The use of the word "architecture" in this context is metaphorical. Architecture literally
means a style of building.' Here it is being used in an extended sense as it is in relation to
computer systems where it refers to the conceptual structure and logical organization of a
computer or computer-based system.2 It refers to the structure of the evolving global fi-
nancial services markets or a desirable regulatory structure to encompass them.
We examine below the many and varied factors that are currently swept up in the term
globalism or globalization. The principal driving forces are capital market imbalances, in-
novations in computer and telecommunication technology, deregulation and the influence
*John H. Farrar is Professor of Law at Bond University and Professorial Associate at the University of
Melbourne.
1. Oxford English Dictionary 435 (13th ed. 1976).
2. Id. See Markus Ebert, The Asian Financial Crisis & the Need for a New Global Financial Architecture, BuT-
TERWOrTHS J. IN-r'L BANKING & FIN. L. 454 (1998); BARRY J. EICHENGREEN, TOWARDS A NEW IN-TERNATIONAL
FrANCIA ARCHITEcTURE (1999); Robert E. Rubin, Remarks on Reform of the International Financial Archi-
tecture to the School of Advanced International Studies (Apr. 21, 1999) <http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/pr3093.htm>.
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of modem finance theory on risk and diversification, hedging, and arbitrage.' These forces
prompt national securities regulators to seek a set of international cooperative measures to
facilitate effective regulation of domestic markets. 4 They also highlight the maze of con-
tradictory regulatory requirements that have evolved for path dependent reasons in different
jurisdictions.5 On the other hand, diversity in regulation can sometimes serve useful eco-
nomic ends in the sense of promoting innovation and competition without necessarily lead-
ing to a race to the bottom.
6
The protracted Southeast Asian financial crisis and the agreement on financial services
through the ratification of the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) have
occasioned a call for a new financial architecture to improve the level of transparency, ac-
countability and prudential supervision, and regulation of the financial services industry.'
Thus, George Soros in his new book, The Crisis of Global Capitalism,' has argued that the
present system is inherently unstable and argued against the view that financial markets
tend towards equilibrium. His argument is influenced by Karl Popper's philosophy and is
based on fallibility, reflexivity and open society.9 Others, while not espousing such theo-
retical assumptions, argue a similar case.'0
The arguments are for:
* a common set of objectives and
* the selection of an appropriate supervisory body with
* universal appeal,
* the necessary supervisory skills, and
* enforcement powers."I
It is argued that of the main international bodies, the World Trade Organization (WTO)
seems best suited to this role in relation to financial services, although it has limited dispute
resolution powers and a currently frozen budget. The GATS has the support of 102 nations
that are committed to integrating their economies to create a new global economic system. 2
In developing a new system characterized by transparency, accountability, and effective
regulation of the financial services industry, the promotion of similar virtues in the portfolio
companies is arguably a necessary corollary.
Yet, to understand these trends one needs to see the evolution of the present situation.
We must look first at the forces of globalization that have led to it and how nation-states,
regions, and international bodies have dealt with some of these forces in the past. In doing
so we can place corporate governance more accurately in an international perspective and
3. Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalization of the WorM's Securities Markets: Economic Causes & Regulatory
Consequences, 4J. FIN. SERvIcEs RES. 349, 360-65 (1990).
4. Id. at 367-70.
5. Id. at 367, 370-71.
6. Id. at 367, 371-73.
7. Ebert, supra note 2.
8. GEORGE SOROS, THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1998).
9. Id. See generally preface & ch. 1.
10. See, e.g., RICHARD O'BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF GEOGRAPHY, 101 passim
(1992).
11. Ebert, supra note 2, at 460-62.
12. Id. at 462.
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see what, if any, lessons can be learned from the past. However, we must first consider the
meaning of corporate governance.
The term corporate governance, which emanates from the United States, has become a
fashionable idea in the last decade. Like most fashionable ideas, it is remarkably imprecise.
In fact, a number of ideas are in circulation under this heading and a number of interests
are staking their claims to recognition in the administration of corporate affairs. Although
many ideas about corporate governance have an international quality, each country has
approached it against a background of its own distinctive culture. In Australia, for example,
the impression is that this lies somewhat uneasily between the culture of the outlaw Ned
Kelly and that of his gaoler."
If we adopt the position that corporate governance is about the legitimacy of corporate
power, corporate accountability, and the standards by which the corporation is to be gov-
erned and by whom, it is obvious that the concept transcends legal standards and liability,
perhaps reflecting the fact that the law deals with a minimal morality of obligation rather
than a morality of aspiration. 14
Corporate governance debate is often about the method as opposed to the substance of
corporate decision-making. Nevertheless, it seems too narrow to limit it exclusively to
questions of method and good housekeeping.
A residual question is whether the evolving structure of the financial services markets or
the norms of global corporate governance represents a form of global law without a state.
Gunter Teubner has referred to it as a self validating Global Bukowina," echoing the so-
ciologist of law, Eugen Ehrlich, who came from the Bukowina region of the former Austro
Hungarian Empire now incorporated in the Ukraine. Ehrlich, it must be remembered,
wrote that "The center of gravity of legal development... from time immemorial has not
lain in the activity of the state but in society itself, and must be sought there at the present
time."1 6 The idea of a "living law," which transcends nation-states and conventional legal
sources and forms, has some kind of appeal in this as in other areas of commercial life.
III. Globalization and Transition
We live in a complex period of transition and the consequences of dismantling a world
order built up in the aftermath of the Second World War. This period of transition is
characterized by the following diverse phenomena: 7
13. See John H. Farrar, Corporate Governance, Business Judgment and the Professionalism of Directors 6 CORP. &
Bus. L.J. 1 (1993).
14. Id.
15. Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism and the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A
STATE 3-31 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
16. EUGEN EHRLICH, PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 390 (Walter L. Moll trans., 1936).
17. See Grundfest, supra note 3; O'BRIEN supra note 10; VUAY GOvINDARAJAN & ANIL GUPTA, MASTERING
GLOBAL BUSINESS (1999); PAUL Q. HIRST & GRAHAM THOMPSON, GLOBALISATION IN QUESTION (1996); KEN'ICHi
OMAE, THE END OF THE NATION-STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMICS (1995); D. Held et al., The Glob-
alization of Economic Activity, 2 NEW POL. ECON. 257 (1997); WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT
(1997); ROBERT B. REICH, THE BORDERLESS WORLD (1990); ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS (1992);
JOHN A. WISEMAN, GLOBAL NATION: AUSTRALIA AND THE POLITICS OF GLOBALIZATION (1998); HANS-PETER
MARTIN & HARALD SCHUMANN, THE GLOBAL TRAP: GLOBALIZATION AND THE ASSAULT ON PROSPERITY AND
DEMOCRACY (1997); OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TOWARDS A MORE
COHERENT GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1998). See generally GLOBAL L. STUD. J. since 1993.
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1. The breakdown of the World International Monetary Order agreed at Bretton
Woods in 1944;
2. The growth of multinational and transnational corporations and enterprise since
1945;
3. The rapid development of computer and telecommunications and the resulting re-
duction in trading costs on international capital markets;
4. The international financial revolution;
5. The rise of international institutional investment;
6. Capital market imbalances caused by differences in savings rates and investment
opportunities and international trade imbalances such as the OPEC and later Japa-
nese surpluses;
7. The collapse of communism in the former USSR and Eastern Europe;
8. The decline of statism and the growth of corporatization and privatization of public
enterprise;
9. The growth of regionalism with such bodies as the European Union and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the attempts to activate an Asian
Pacific region through APEC, which is complicated inter alia by the presence of the
United States and Canada;
10. Falling trade barriers and increasing international competition; and
11. The rise of some developing countries, such as China and India, which have vast
economic potential.
Much of this we attempt to sum up in the protean term "globalization." The idea of
globalization is not new. Exploration, trade, and migration have always been with us. An
example is the transmission of information over long distances through trade routes. Some
of the events described are interlinked but sometimes the question of causation is complex.
Globalization is currently the subject of many books and articles. One of these, "Globali-
zation in Question," in a useful short chapter in the Financial Times publication Mastering
Global Business,'8 has a suitably ambiguous title. Professors Vijay Govindarajan and Anil
Gupta define globalization as "the growing economic interdependence among countries as
reflected in increasing cross-border flows of goods, services, capital, and know-how." They
cite the following trends as evidence:
1. Between 1989 and 1996, cross-border trade in goods and services grew at an annual
average rate of 6.2 percent.
2. From 1980 to 1994, foreign direct investment grew from 4.8 percent to 9.6 percent
of World GDP.
3. In 1970, cross-border transactions in bonds and equities as a ratio of GDP stood at
under five percent in the United States, Germany and Japan. By 1996, the respective
figures were 152 percent, 197 percent and 83 percent. 19
4. Globalization can be viewed at the level of a specific country, or a specific industry or
a specific company.'0 Thus, China, for example, globalized its economy much faster
than India in the period from 1980 to 1994.21 In the case of the pharmaceutical in-
18. GOviNDARAJAN & GuPTA, supra note 17, at 5.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 5-7.
21. Id. at 6.
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dustry, worldwide production increased 7.4 percent, cross-border trade 10.9 percent,
and cross-border investment 14.9 percent per annum in the period of 1980 to 1994.22
Toyota is an example of a globalized company with one-third of its global output from
affiliates in twenty-five different countries. 3
What is new about the current processes is the extent to which time and space have been
compressed by new technologies and the impact this has had on the patterns of financing
corporations and spreading risk in investment.24
IV. Impacts of Globalization
In a complex relationship of cause and effect of globalization, an increasing number of
countries are adopting the techniques, if not the ideology, of the free market. Advances in
technology are constantly improving communications, which interacts with market forces
in a similarly complex way. The removal of barriers to trade and investment creates op-
portunities for national companies in overseas markets, but it also opens the door to com-
petitors in domestic markets.25 The impact of this is affecting labor markets in developed
countries. The speed and complexity of change has threatened the capacity of national
governments to deal with the local impact of change, particularly when it results from events
on the other side of the world.2 6
In the past, national governments have encountered globalization mainly through the
activities of multinational and transnational enterprises.
Transnational enterprise has eluded the regulation of nation-states, and even regions, in
the period since the Second World War. It would be a mistake to think that all such en-
terprise is necessarily a large, widely held publicly listed corporation. However, many of
the significant players are transnational enterprises and it is to the various attempts to
regulate them that we must now turn to determine what lessons can be learned.
V. Past Experience in Dealing with Globalization-
Regulating Multinational and Transnational Enterprise
2 7
The multinational enterprise represents the latest stage of development of the national
company group that evolved from a local corporate enterprise similarly evolving from a
local non-corporate enterprise. Just as the issues of ownership and control are important
in relation to national enterprises, they are crucial in relation to multinational enterprise
where the question's resolution has a necessarily political significance. The multinational
enterprise poses additional problems because it is not one discrete legal form, but many.
As the late Wolfgang Friedman wrote:
It is the complexity of its legal structure, or rather the interplay of legal entities and relation-
ships constituting that structure, no less than the size of its resources or the scale of its opera-
tions, which makes its power so elusive and so formidable a challenge to the political order
22. Id.
23. Id. at 7.
24. See Grundfest, supra note 3; O'BRIEN, supra note 10.
25. See GOVINDARAJAN & GuPTA, supra note 17, at 9.
26. See id.
27. This is based on JOHN H. FARRAR et al., FARRAR'S COMPANY LAw, ch. 44 (4th ed. 1998).
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and rule of law. It is therefore inherent in the nature of the multinational corporation that
there is no simple solution for the problem of its relationship to states, the world of states, or
an organized world community .... 11
The political and legal regulation of multinational enterprise may be classified under four
headings that correspond approximately to stages of historical development. These are
(1) national, (2) bilateral, (3) regional, and (4) international regulation.
A. NATIONAL REGULATION
It is necessary to distinguish between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction to make prescriptive laws is very broad, and may be based on territory, nation-
ality, or probably even the fact that particular conduct has effects in the state purporting to
exercise jurisdiction.29 By contrast, the jurisdiction to enforce those laws is narrow, limited
to the territory of the state in question. Hence, there are problems with national regulation
where the multinational keeps the bulk of its assets outside the state seeking to regulate it
-the latter will be unable to access those assets to satisfy judgments. Additionally, states
may have prescriptive jurisdiction under the effects doctrine, for example, where a multi-
national competitor engages in export dumping, thereby threatening a state-owned indus-
try. The state, however, will be unable to enforce it unless the multinational is present
within it. That is, a state may suffer at the hands of a multinational, but may not have any
national means of redress open to it.?°
A liberal regime to domestic companies by the countries of origin created the economic
conditions that favored the growth of multinational enterprise. The United Kingdom, for
instance, has generally favored a very liberal regime, like other European states. To a large
extent this has been based on enlightened self-interest since a number of multinationals are
headquartered in the United Kingdom and the city of London has traditionally financed
many multinational operations.
For host states there is often a dilemma of regulating conduct against the national interest
while not discouraging foreign investment. Canada has faced this dilemma because of its
proximity to the United States. On the whole, it has favored the presence of subsidiaries
of foreign corporations, although since 1972 it has screened new direct foreign investment.3
The main worries, apart from loss of control, that individual nations have are that multi-
nationals may reduce the effectiveness of national monetary policy, evade taxation, and
injure labor relations.
The most effective and systematic form of regulation seems to be control over initial
capital investment. Control over later behavior seems more ad hoc, particularly in those host
countries without a strong legal tradition.
28. Transnational Law in a Changing Society 79, 80 (Wolfgang Gaston Friedman et al., eds. 1972). See also
Clive M. Schmitthoff, Multinationals in Court, J. Bus. L. 103 (1972).
29. See J.G. STARKE, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 8 (I. A. Shearer ed., 11th ed. 1984).
30. See P. EBow BONDZI-SIMPSON, LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
HOST STATES 33-38 (1990).
31. See ROBERT E. TINDALL, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: LEGAL AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES AND
INTERRELATIONSHIP WITH OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, ANTITRUST, LABOR, TAXATION AND DISCLOSURE (1975);JOAN
EDELMAN SPERO, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS ch. 4 (5th ed. 1997).
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B. BILATERAL REGULATION
Bilateral arrangements have increased in the last three decades. These have taken the
form of investment protection and promotion treaties and reflect the desire of home country
governments to protect the investments of their companies abroad and the desire of host
countries to attract foreign direct investment. Normally, such treaties provide for legal
protection of foreign direct investment. They also provide legal protection for foreign
subsidiaries and aim to produce a stable environment for development. In the period be-
tween 1945 and the mid-1960s, the United States was the first country to seek to achieve
its objectives in this manner. Many of the bilateral treaties were concluded with developed
countries. The emphasis of the early treaties, however, had more to do with international
trade and protection of citizens abroad than foreign direct investment. From the 1960s
onwards, treaties tended to be more concerned with foreign direct investment and many
of these were concluded with developing countries. The Federal Republic of Germany
concluded more than fifty agreements of this kind by the end of 1983. Today there are
more than 200 such treaties in force, many of which have been initiated between members
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and developing
countries. It should be noted that such treaties do not normally contain obligations for
home country governments to promote foreign direct investment. The mere existence of
an investment protection treaty is unlikely to lead to increased flows of investment unless
there are other inducements. Conversely, the absence of such a treaty where there are other
such inducements will not necessarily deter foreign investment. The role of such treaties,
therefore, is simply marginal to the decision-making of the multinational and the host
country.32
C. REGIONAL REGULATION
The United States, Canada, and Australia are all federations, yet each effectively operates
as one economic unit. Since 1954, there have been a number of looser economic groupings
such as EFTA, the European Union, and NAFTA. Other groupings, such as OPEC, have
been established on the basis of specialized markets.
Of these groupings of states, the most important for our purpose is the European Union.
The lack of any provision in the Treaty of Rome has hindered progress. The member states
have consistently refused to yield any national authority to the European Union. In the
past, various attempts-the adoption of a regulation of foreign investment in 1965, a com-
mission proposal to protect employees in the event of takeovers, the formulation of common
industrial policy, and the adoption of a convention on internal mergers-were all unsuc-
cessful." Recently, however, mergers and joint ventures affecting market structure signifi-
32. See Work Related to the Formulation ofa Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations and OtherInternational
Arrangements and Agreements, Bilateral, Regional and International Managements on Matters Relating to Transna-
tional Corporations. Report of the Secretariat of the UN Economic and Social Council, U.N. ESCOR, 10th Sess.,
Agenda Item 5(b), U.N. Doc. E/C.10/1984/8 (1984).
33. See SPERO, supra note 31, at 134-37. See Multinational Undertakings and Community Regulations, BULL.
Eon. COMMUNITIES SupP. 15/73; COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE
COMMUNITY: MEMORANDUM FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL (1970); Draft Convention on Interna-
tional Mergers of Societies Anonymes, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES SUPP. 13/73; John H. Dunning & Peter
Robson, Multinational Corporate Integration and Regional Economic Integration, J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 103
(1987).
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candy must be approved by the commission. Multinationals operating within the European
Union and having 1,000 or more employees in more than one EU country are required to
set up European Works Councils. These affect multinational enterprise as do the account-
ing and auditing changes.
D. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), and the OECD all have some bearing on the activities of multinationals. The
IMF provides for convertibility of currency and repatriation of funds. The GATT facilitates
international production and transfers. Of particular relevance are the two fundamental
GATT obligations, most-favored nation and national treatment. In addition, there are
multinationals' traditional concerns with trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
and trade-related investment measures. There is also the GATS agreement on trade in
services, which parallels GAT. The OECD facilitates freedom of establishment.
On the other hand, the special attempts to deal with multinational enterprise have not
been successful. The Havana Charter, which was to have provided for a liberal regime of
foreign investment, was later amended by Third World countries to protect host countries
and was opposed by the United States.34
In 1976, the OECD adopted voluntary guidelines for conduct by multinationals." The
guidelines are recommendations addressed jointly by the member countries to the multi-
nationals operating within their territories. They are not legally binding. They do not
provide a precise definition of multinational, although the guidelines refer to groups that
comprise companies and other legal entities having private, public, or mixed capital, estab-
lished in various countries and linked in such a manner that one or more of them are in a
position to exercise significant influence on the countries of others, and, in particular, to
share knowledge and resources amongst themselves. The guidelines contain a statement of
general policies and then deal with six topics-disclosure of information, competition, fi-
nancing, taxation, employment and labor relations, and service and technology.
With regard to disclosure, the number and scope of the items of information requested
is extensive, while at the same time an attempt is made to protect the legitimate require-
ments of business secrecy.
An acute problem that the guidelines address is the question of transfer pricing. They
provide that multinationals must refrain from making use of transfer pricing that does not
conform to an arms-length standard.
A third problem is the question of bribes. Here, the guidelines draw the line at what is
legal, although even this is questionable since some payments that are legal may still be
grossly immoral.
In the 1970s, the United Nations set up a Centre on Transnational Corporations (CTC)
to gather and disseminate information on multinationals and an intergovernmental Com-
34. See SPERO, supra note 31, at 138.
35. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REVIEW OF THE 1976 DECLARATION
AND DECISIONS ON GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: NATIONAL TREATMENT, INTERNATIONAL IN-
VESTMENT INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES, CONSULTATION PROCEDURES (1979); Compare Henri Schwamm, The
OECD Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 342 (1978), with THE OECD GUIDELINES
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (1994).
VOL. 33, NO. 4
THE NFA AND EFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 935
mission on Transnational Corporations to act as a forum for discussion of related issues
and to supervise the center.3 6 Of these two bodies, the first will probably prove the most
practical since ignorance of empirical data impedes rational debate and leads to perpetuation
of myth.
From 1977 until 1992, the Working Group of the Commission was engaged in the
formation of a code of conduct as its highest priority. It decided against using the OECD
guidelines as its starting point. 7
The benefits of such a code were considered by the Round Table on the Code of Conduct
of Transnational Corporations held in Montreux, Switzerland, in October 1986. The
Round Table identified the following benefits.
1. It would establish a balanced set of standards of good corporate conduct to be observed
by multinationals in their operations and of standards to be observed by governments
in their treatment of multinationals.
2. It would help ensure that the activities of multinationals were integrated in the de-
velopment policies of the developing countries.
3. It would establish inter alia the confidence, predictability and stability required for
development of foreign direct investment in a mutually beneficial manner.
4. It would contribute to a reduction of friction and conflict between multinationals and
host countries.
5. It would encourage positive adjustment through the growth of productive capacities.
Progress on the code was slow and in 1992 it was announced that no consensus was
possible. The CTC was absorbed into UNCTAD in Geneva.
Since 1992, the focus has shifted to environmental protection as a follow-up to the U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development. Four trends have been recognized in re-
lation to multinationals and transnationals:
1. the growing role of such entities in sustainable growth;
2. the expansion of corporate environmental management practices;
3. harmonization of environmental regulations affecting them; and
4. the emergence of voluntary environmental guidelines by such entities.
In addition, a number of international institutions, including the Intergovernmental
Group of Experts established by the Centre of Transnational Corporations, have worked
on the elaboration of international standards on accounting and reporting. Also, the Multi-
lateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) was established under the aegis of the World
Bank. MIGA's main role is to provide insurance coverage for non-commercial work in-
volved in transnational investments.
36. See P.D. Maynard, The Commission and Centre on International Corporations, 1 COMPANY LAw. 226 (1980)
[hereinafter The Commission]; P.D. Maynard, A Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, 4 COMPANY LAW.
103 (1983) [hereinafter Code of Conduct]; MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS LAW (Kenneth R. Simmonds ed.,
1992).
37. See CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT ON TRANS-
NATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1988). Code of Conduct, supra note 36, at 104; Pieter Sanders, Implementing Interna-
tional Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 30 Am. J. CoMp. L. 241 (1982); Peter Hansen & Victoria
Aranda, An Emerging International Framework for Tranmational Corporations, 14 FDuHom INT'L LJ. 881 (1990-
91).
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Over twenty years ago, the International Accounting Standards Committee (LASC) and
the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) were established by the accounting
profession to develop international standards for the preparation and verification of cor-
porate information.
The role of IASC is to develop International Accounting Standards (IASs) that are pro-
duced by a consultative process. A Standing Interpretations Committee examines urgent
issues arising from interpretation of the existing standards or new matters of concern. The
role of IFAC is more broad. It includes the development of International Standards of
Auditing (ISAs) and a Code of Ethics. IFAC is not involved in developing accounting stan-
dards but simply in assisting in their promulgation.
In December 1996, the meeting of Ministers of the World Trade Organization encour-
aged the successful completion of international standards in the accounting sector by IFAC,
IASC, and the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO)? The
Group of Seven, the World Bank, and the United Nations have supported these initiatives.
It is easy to dismiss such voluntary codes as unimportant since they are not legally binding,
but this would be a mistake. Such codes may form the basis of subtle diplomacy by the
United Nations towards a consensus among governments, which in turn will be embodied
in national legislation or professional standards. Such a consensus will, in any event, help
host countries negotiate with multinationals. It also may assist trade unions in both home
countries in opposing outward investment and host countries in seeking regulation of multi-
national practices contrary to the interests of their members.3 9
VI. Globalization, Regionalism, and National Corporate
Law Models-Markets or Harmonization?
The impacts of globalization motivate developed countries to think about regional trade
blocs and harmonization of laws. They also motivate developing countries to think of adopt-
ing new laws based on major western models.4
In the last 150 years there have been a number of dominant western models of corporate
laws and securities regulations. The British imperial model was important through the
1960s. It was adopted in the countries of the commonwealth and had some influence beyond
those boundaries. 41 Germany at the end of the nineteenth century and in this century has
been a successful innovator in the use of the corporate form and contributed the private
company, two-tier boards, worker participation, and a novel approach to groups. 42 This has
38. See Frank Harding, Corporate Credibility-Why a Harmonized Global Accountancy Framework Matters, Ac-
COUNTANCY IRELAND, Apr. 1, 1999, at 16.
39. See Malcolm Crawford, The Case Against Multinationals: The Main Criticism Reexamined, in TEN YEARS
OF MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS 15 (Malcolm Crawford & James Poole eds. 1982); see also Thomas H. Reynolds,
Clouds of Codes: The New International Economic Order Through Codes of Conduct: A Survey, in 4 MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS LAW, supra note 36; NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAMME FOR SURVIVAL: THE REPORT OF THE INDE-
PENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF WILLY BRANDT
ch. 12 (1980).
40. Take for instance the recent examples of the Peoples Republic of China and Indonesia.
41. Farrar, supra note 27, at ch. 42.
42. See HANS WURDINGER, GERMAN COMPANY LAW (1975); JONATHAN P. CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COM-
PANY: A STUDY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES ch. 2 (1994); KlausJ. Hopt, The German Two-
Tier Board (Aufrichsna): A German View on Corporate Governance, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ESSAYS AND MATERIALS ch. I (KlausJ. Hopt & E. Wymeersch eds., 1997).
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had influence in Western Europe, Japan, and Korea. Since 1933, the United States has been
one of the world's leaders in corporate law and securities regulation although some would
place the influence earlier.43
The United States is a continent as well as a country and has opted for a market approach
to corporate laws.- Each state is a separate corporate law jurisdiction with its own Business
Corporations Act, although much of securities regulation is federal. The extent of the
market for corporation law statutes can be exaggerated due to the dominance of Delaware
and the Revised Model Business Corporations Act, which is adopted in a number of states.
41
Canada, since the 1970s, has been influenced increasingly by U.S. corporate law ideas.
The U.S. influence on the Ontario reforms of the 1970s and the subsequent Dickerson
Report, which led to the Canada Business Corporations Act, was strong. Canada has a
greater degree of similarity among the Ontario, federal, and a number of the other provin-
cial statutes than the United States but still lacks uniformity.4
Since 1962, Australia has developed uniform laws and an effectively national scheme.
This in turn influenced Malaysia and Singapore in its 1962 form.
47
Since 1973, the United Kingdom has been a member of the European Union and subject
to an elaborate scheme of harmonization of laws that has recently lost some of its momen-
tum. In the comparative quietus, the United Kingdom is attempting a thorough reform of
its Company Law, a project that bears an ill-defined relationship to its European Union
obligations.4
Important questions face each nation-state as to which models of company law and se-
curities regulation are best in an era of globalization. Much can be learned from the ex-
perience of the European Union, being the most elaborate attempt to produce harmonized
laws on an international basis.
VII. The Process of Harmonization of National Corporate
Governance Laws in the EU49
A. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY OF ROME °
Article 2 of the treaty sets out the goals of the European Union. These include the
establishment of a common market and an economic and monetary union, progressive
approximation of the economic policies of member states, the promotion throughout the
community of a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, and closer
relations between the states belonging to it. For purposes of article 2, article 3 provides for
an internal market characterized by the abolition of obstacles to freedom of movement of
43. See ROBERTA RomANo, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 13 (1993).
44. See id.
45. See CALLY JORDAN, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE LAW IN ASIA, EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND
THE COMMONWEALTH pt. 4 (1997).
46. See FRANK IACOBUCCI ET AL., CANADIAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT LEGISLATIVE
DEVELOPMENTS ch. 1 (1997); JORDAN, supra note 45.
47. See WALTER C.M. WOON, COMPANY LAW 4 (2d ed. 1997).
48. See MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY-THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK: CONSULTA-
TION DOCUMENT FROM THE COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP (1999).
49. See FARRAR, supra note 2 7, at ch. 3. See generally William J. Davey, European Integration: Reflections on its
Limits & Effects, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 185 (1993).
50. See generally Davey, supra note 49.
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goods, persons, services, and capital, and the approximation of the laws of member states
to the extent required for the proper functioning of the common market.
The treaty recognizes certain basic freedoms, one of which is the right of establishment.
Article 52 provides for the abolition of restrictions on the freedom of establishment of
nationals of a member state in the territory of another. This includes freedom to set up and
manage undertakings, particularly companies or firms within the meaning of article 58.
Article 58 defines companies or firms broadly to include companies or firms constituted
under civil or commercial law, such as cooperative societies and other legal persons gov-
erned by the public or private law, except non-profit entities. Article 54 provides for the
drafting of a general program for the abolition of existing restrictions on freedom of estab-
lishment within the European Community. Under article 54 (3)(g), the council and the
commission are instructed to carry out their duties as follows:
[By] coordinating to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the protection of the in-
terests of members and others, are required by member states of companies or firms within
the meaning of the second paragraph of article 58 with a view to making such safeguards
equivalent throughout the Community.
Article 100 is a general provision on approximation of laws. It provides that the council
must, acting unanimously on a proposal from the commission, issue directives for the ap-
proximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation, or administrative action in
member states and directly affecting the establishment or functioning of the common mar-
ket. The Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee must be consulted when
directives whose implementation would, in one or more member states, involve the amend-
ment of legislation. Articles 100A and 1OB, which were added by the Single European
Act, provide for qualified majorities in certain cases.
Article 220 requires member states, so far as is necessary, to enter into negotiations with
a view to securing inter alia the mutual recognition of companies or firms within the mean-
ing of the second paragraph of article 58. It also requires negotiation for the retention of
legal personality in the event of transfer of the member's seat from one country to another;
the possibility of mergers between companies or firms governed by the laws of different
countries; and the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and
enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards. These negoti-
ations lead to international treaties that supplement existing treaties. An example is the
1968 convention on mutual recognition of companies. Article 221 provides for abolition of
all discriminatory provisions in the laws of member states with respect to equity partici-
pation in companies.
Lastly, article 235 contains sweeping-up provisions. If action by the European Union
proves necessary to attain one of its objectives and the Treaty of Rome does not prescribe
the necessary powers, the council must, acting unanimously on a proposal from the com-
mission and after consulting the Parliament, take appropriate action.
B. PATTERNS OF LEGAL INTEGRATION
The three basic legal techniques of integration are: (1) the removal of all restrictions that
discriminate on the basis of nationality including restrictions on freedom of establishment;
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(2) the establishment of common rules and common policies; and (3) the approximation of
national laws under article 3(h). 1
The treaty also uses the terms harmonization and coordination, preferred by English
lawyers, but there is little consistency in their use and no meaningful difference between
them. 52 All three techniques fall short of unification.
The commission usually prepares drafts of proposal. They may be discussed subsequently
in a group convened by the commission and comprised of experts (i.e., officials) from mem-
ber states and may be circulated by the commission to interested outside bodies. After
adoption by the commission as formal proposals, they are sent to the European Parliament
and the Economic and Social Committee for comment. In light of these opinions, the
commission may amend their proposals before presentation to the Council of Ministers for
discussions in a working group of officials from the various member states. Such discussions
are normally chaired by officials from the member state holding the Presidency of the
Council of Ministers. They are subsequently referred to the Committee of Permanent
Representatives (COREPER), which in turn refers them to the Council of Ministers for
final decision.53
C. PROGRESS TO DATE
Within the European Union, some progress has been made on three broad fronts. First,
the directives prepared under the provisions of article 54(3)(g); second, treaties drawn under
article 220; and third, a draft regulation providing a statute for a European company that
exists under article 235. Although the European Union has been successful in harmoniza-
tion of share capital, accounting, and auditing, it has not experienced equal success in the
area of corporate governance. The following directives are relevant.
The First Directive (68/151/EEC) 4 was adopted on March 9, 1968, and mainly provided
for relief against the doctrine of ultra vires and limits of directors' authority as well as
providing for some basic publicity. The directive was implemented by the United Kingdom
in section 9 of the European Communities Act 1972 as amended by section 35A of the
Companies Act 1989."1
The Draft Fifth Directive 6 deals with the important topics of company structure and
worker participation and has been the subject of much controversy." The present position
51. See generally RICHARD M. BUXBAUM, LEGAL HARMONIZATION THE BusINEss ENTERPRISE: CORPORATEAND
CAPITAL MARKET LAW, HARMONIZATION ON POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE U.S.A. chs. 3-4 (1988).
52. See Dr. C. D. Ehlermann, Director General of the Legal Service of the Commission, lecture published
in App3 (b) of the Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (HLSC) (HL 131) (1977-78). See
also PietJan Slot, Harmonization 21 E.U.C. L. REV. 378 (1996); Benjamin Lo, Improving Corporate Governance:
Lessonsfroa the European Community, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 219 (1993).
53. See DEPARTMENT OP TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE SINGLE MARKET: COMPANY LAW HARMONIATION(1993).
54. 1977 O.J. (L26) 1-13.
55. See D.D. Prentice, Section Nine of the European Community Act, 89 LQR 518 (1973); John H. Farrar &
D. G. Powles, 36 MLR 270 (1973);J. G. Collier & L. S. Sealy, CLJ 1 (1973). See also CA 1985, §§ 35, 25A;
FARRAR, surpa note 27, ch. 10.
56. 1972 J.O. (131) 49. See also 1991 O.J. (C321) 9 for the current version of this Directive; EMPLOYEE
PARTICIPATION AND COMPANY STRUCTURE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, BULL EUR. Supp. 8/75; C.M.
Schmitthoff, Editorial, J. Bus. L., 456. See J.J. Du Plessis & J. Dine, The Fate of the Draft Fifth Directive on
Company Law: Accommodation Instead of Harmonization, 1997 J. Bus. L., 23.
57. See Jane Welch, The Fifth Draft Directive-A False Dawn, 8 EUR. L. REV. 83 (1983). See also Dr. Walter
Kolvenbach, EEC Company Law Harmonization and Worker Participation, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 709, 720-
33 (1990).
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is that the commission's modified proposal is under consideration by a Council Working
Group of officials from the member states and the commission. It is anticipated that dis-
cussion of the draft will take several more years. The new draft provides for a distinction
between directors of a public limited company who will be responsible for management
and those responsible for their supervision. At the end of 1983, the commission announced
an alteration so that this distinction could be achieved either through a two-tier board or
a conventional one-tier board as in the United Kingdom. On the one-tier board, there
would be a division between executive directors who would manage, and non-executive
directors who would supervise. The implementation of this distinction as a matter of law
would require changes to English law.
Employee participation in corporate decision-making would be required to take one of
the following forms:
1. through board representation at the supervisory level;
2. by means of a works council; or
3. through collective agreements giving the same rights as (1) or (2).
Further options are included in respect of employee participation in groups of companies.
In addition to these major provisions, the latest draft also includes provisions in respect of
(a) the duties and liabilities of directors; (b) the power of the general meeting; (c) the rights
of shareholders and in particular minority shareholders; (d) approval of annual accounts;
and (e) the functions and liability of auditors. With regard to (a), there is a general provision
for personal liability for loss suffered by the company as a result of breaches of law, the
corporate constitution or other wrongful acts. Liability is to be joint and several, which
would involve a change in English law and arguably lead to more effective monitoring of
management by management. An individual director may be exonerated if he or she can
prove that no fault is attributable to him or her personally. The draft does not define the
standard of care required of directors, although the Commission's Explanatory Memoran-
dum to the original proposal in 1972 suggested that "other wrongful acts" might include
negligence and would arguably go further than the current law. With regard to (b), share-
holders are given slightly more rights with respect to the convening of meetings.
As regards (c), articles 16-18 allow a minority shareholder to bring a derivative action on
behalf of the company, even where the general meeting has expressly renounced its right
to bring proceedings, provided that the plaintiff shareholder voted against the resolution
or made objection which was recorded in the minutes. Proceedings can be instituted by a
simple majority of the shareholders, or in the case of a derivative action, by shareholders
holding five percent of the issued capital or shares to the value of 100,000 ECUs. An
unsuccessful shareholder who fails to establish reasonable grounds for commencing the
proceedings may be ordered to pay costs. Under the original article 19, a derivative action
could also be brought by a creditor who was unable to obtain payment and would not be
affected by any waiver by the company of a breach of duty. This was deleted and replaced
by a vague provision that leaves the matter to be determined by the laws of the member
state.
Other important provisions prevent a shareholder from voting on an issue where there
is a conflict of interest between the company and him or her personally. This would go
further than the existing English law. Another provision renders void shareholder agree-
ments whereby a shareholder always votes in a certain way. This would involve an alteration
of the English law. There are provisions for compulsory reserves and appropriation of
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profits. The latter would have the effect of shifting the power to determine dividends to
the general meeting. Both of these would involve a change in English law.
We will not comment on the detailed provisions respecting auditors and accounts. In
addition, there is Directive 94/95/EC of September 22, 1994, on the establishment of a
European Works Council, and also a draft directive on procedures for informing and con-
sulting employees which overlaps with the Fifth Directive. This is sometimes known as the
Vredeling Directive.58
The Draft Ninth Directive, which has never been published in the Official Journal, deals
with certain aspects of the group relationship.5s The preliminary draft was greatly influenced
by the German law relating to groups. A revised text was circulated informally to member
states in December 1984. The revised text seeks to provide an organized legal structure for
the "unified management" of a public limited company that is controlled by any other
undertaking, whether a company or not, and of that other undertaking. The directive will
also set out rules for the conduct of groups that are not subject to "unified management,"
although in this case the rules would apply to the relations between the parent or dominant
undertaking and those members of the group that are public limited companies. Unless the
dominant undertaking formalizes its relationship by one of the methods specified by the
directive it will be liable for any losses sustained by the dependent company resulting from
that influence and attributed to a fault in management or to action that was not in its
interests. There are to be two methods for constituting a group-the control contract or
a unilateral declaration of control. In addition, the directive would leave member states free
to introduce other methods of achieving the same result.
The Twelfth Directive 60 allows for private companies with only one member. This was
already permitted in a number of jurisdictions.
The Proposal for a Thirteenth Directive6' deals with takeovers and is influenced by the
City of London Takeover Code. The proposal has been strongly attacked. The UK Gov-
ernment is concerned that it is too inflexible and may inhibit takeovers. On the other hand,
other member states have criticized it because it opens the door to hostile takeovers by
blocking certain takeover defenses. The position regarding takeover differs between mem-
ber states. For example, in Germany the practice is for shares to be held by banks for their
own account or for their clients, and thus a takeover of a German listed company cannot
be effected without the consent of the banks involved. An amended proposal was issued in
1996.
Secondly, there are international conventions. On February 29, 1968, the original mem-
ber states of the European Union other than the Netherlands signed the convention on the
mutual recognition of companies and legal persons.62 The convention was to apply to all
58. 1983 OJ. (C 217) 26, 3-16.
59. See FRANK WOOLRIDGE, GROUPS OF COMPANIES: THE LAW AND PRACTICE IN BRITAIN, FRANCE AND GER-
MANY (1981); TOM HADDEN, THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE GROUPS 42 (1983);Jane Welch, Ninth Draft Direc-
tive: The Institute of Directors Response, 7 COMPANY LAW. 112 (1986); K. Gleichmann, The Law of Corporate Groups
in the EC, in REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS IN EUROPE (David Sugarman & Gunther Teubner eds., 1990).
60. 1989 O.J. (L 395) 32.
61. 1989 O.J. (C64) 23, 8-14; 1996 O.J. (C162) 5. See L.S. Sealy, The Draft Thirteenth EC Directive on Take-
overs, in EC FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION AND COMPANY LAW ch. 9 (Mads Andenas & Stephen Kenyon-
Slade eds.,1993); Janet Dine, The New Thirteenth Directive, 17 COMPANY LAW. 248 (1996).
62. EEC BULL. Supp. 2/69; BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL LAW. 389 (1973); G.K. Morse,
Mutual Recognition of Companies in England and the EEC, 1972 J. Bus. L. 195.
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companies incorporated in any member state and would include an English partnership.
Recognition was to be accorded when the company has its statutory registered office in one
of the member states. This would be subject to certain exceptions based on the principle
of the real seat. After much discussion, the member states have now decided to abandon
the project. Mutual recognition occurs in practice anyway, without the necessity of a con-
vention.
A draft convention has been prepared dealing with bankruptcy, winding-up arrange-
ments, compositions, and similar proceedings.63 This supplements the convention on mu-
tual recognition of judgments, which has now been given internal effect by legislation. 64 It
has undergone a great deal of revision, particularly as a result of UK membership. This in
essence provides for the rationalization of bankruptcy, winding up, and analogous proceed-
ings in the European Union. First, it sets out detailed rules to enable bankruptcy jurisdiction
to be vested in a single and appropriate national court. Secondly, it seeks to secure that the
liquidator appointed by the court has extensive authority to administer the insolvent estate,
whenever situated in the European Union. Thirdly, it aims at simplification of the liqui-
dator's duties in collecting assets and determining claims by a limited measure of harmo-
nization and identification of applicable law. Fourthly, it seeks simplification of the rules
and reduction of the costs for a foreign creditor making a claim. The convention is likely
to come into effect soon.
The last measure to be discussed is the most ambitious. This is the draft regulation for
a European company.65 The proposal goes beyond harmonization and provides for an ad-
ditional form of incorporation that will have registration with the community. It will be
available when two or more limited companies merge or form a joint holding or subsidiary
company. Much work on this project was done by Professor Pieter Sanders of the Neth-
erlands, although the French claim some responsibility for the paternity of the project. The
project has been under debate for thirty years but acquired momentum as part of the pro-
posals for 1992. The commission adopted an amended draft in April 1996 as a result of the
report of a group of experts chaired by Etienne Davignon and this is the subject of a
Consultative Document by the UK Department of Trade and Industry of July 1997.
D. THE FUTURE OF HARMONIZATION WITHIN THE EU
The tactics employed by the commission have in the past been described as "salami
tactics." In other words, they approached the matter slice by slice. This approach was
63. Report of the Advisory Committee on the Draft Convention (Cmnd 6602). See also Bankruptcy Con-
vention 2611 Report (1980-81) of the HLSC (HL 175) (1980-81); Muir Hunter, The Draft Bankrutpcy Convention
of the European Convention of the European Economic Communities, 21 ITcr'L & COMP. L.Q. 682, (1972), The Draft
Bankruptcy Convention, A Further Eramination, 25 INT'L & COmP. L. Q. 310 (1976); Ian Fletcher, The Proposed
Community Convention on Bankruptcy and Related Matters, 2 EUR. L. REV. 15 (1977); John H. Farrar, The EEC
Draft Convention Bankruptcy and Winding Up, 1977 J. Bus. L. 320; Dr. Frederique Dahan, The European Con-
vention Insolvency Proceedings and the Administrative Receiver: A Missed Opportunity, 17 COMPANY LAw. 181.
64. The Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgements in Civil and Commercial Matters,
dated Sept. 27, 1968, and amended on Oct. 9, 1978, (1978) OJC 304, 30 Oct. (1979) OJC 59, 5 March.
65. See GREAT BRITAIN, DEPT. OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE, A CONSUL-
TATIVE DOCUMENT (1997); Report of the Select Committee on the EEC, HL. Session 1989-90, 1911 Report
(HL Paper 81-I); The European Company Statute, 11 COMPANY LAw. 208; 'Memorandum de la Commission de
la CEE Sur la creation d'une Societe Commerciale europeenne' SEC (66) 1250 22, Apr. 1966 for some earlier
discussions; 'Projet d'un statut des societes anonymes europdennes' Doc 16. 205/1V 66, Dec. 1966. See generally
QUo VADIS Jus SOCIETATUM? (P. Zonderland ed., 1972); FARRAR, supra note 27, at ch. 43.
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criticized on the basis that it was difficult to agree upon any particular directive without
knowing, at least in broad terms, what else was to be done. The counter-argument was that
elaboration of a complete Uniform Companies Act would take a lot of time and bog down
reform within the community for a long time. In any event, it has been said that the statute
for the European company would provide some sort of blueprint.
In recent years, there has been a suspension of work on certain projects and a determi-
nation to concentrate on certain key areas. Some real progress was made with company
accounts and listing requirements. Work on the draft Fifth Directive has continued, al-
though in its nature it is controversial. The key areas on which the commission is currently
engaged are disclosure, corporate governance and its relationship to the draft Fifth Direc-
tive and the statute for a European company. With regard to disclosure, the commission
has participated in the negotiations in the ad hoc expert group on accounting on the United
Nations Center on Multinationals. The original draft, based heavily on German law, has
been the subject of controversy in other member states. This and codetermination have
presented obstacles to implementing a number of other proposals, including the European
Company Proposal. Dorresteijn, Kuiper, and Morse, in European Corporate Law,- argue
that the overall achievements of the harmonization program have been impressive, par-
ticularly when compared with other areas such as taxation, social policy, and competition.
Nevertheless, there are questions as to how the particular instruments of harmonization
have been used. First, directives tend to be over-specific and sometimes do not fit too well
with national laws. Secondly, some directives, like the fourth and seventh, contain too many
options. Thirdly, the harmonization achieved so far has mainly related to the external struc-
ture of the company. Attempts to coordinate provisions relating to the internal structure
have been unsuccessful. The two striking examples are employee participation and the law
of groups. In this respect it is interesting to note the fact that the European Union has to
contend with a market-based outsider model and a representation-based insider model of
corporate governance. 67 Attempts to superimpose one over the other have failed for eco-
nomic as well as social and political reasons.
At the moment it is unclear whether the European Union will continue its harmonization
program. The other alternatives are systems of mutual recognition such as have been em-
ployed for the financial sector and other less formal methods of unification through the
activities of private bodies and systems of self-regulation.
One thing is abundantly clear, the area of least success in the EU program has been
corporate governance due mainly to fundamental differences in national models and the
context in which they operate.
VIII. The Characteristics of the Global
Corporate Landscape
A working paper by three Harvard economists on Corporate Ownership Around the
World published by the National Bureau of Economic Research in 1998 sets out some
useful facts on corporate ownership around the world.6 These include:
66. See ADRIAAN DORRESTEIJN ET AL., EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW, 64-66 (1994).
67. See OECD, FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS 13 (1995) for a discussion of these two models. See also Hans
Blommestein, The New Financial Landscape and its Impact on Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND GLOBAL CONVERGENCE ch. 3 (Morton Balling et al. eds., 1998).
68. See RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL., CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AROUND THE WORLD (National Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 6625, 1998).
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1. The separation of ownership and control in listed public corporations is far from
universal.
2. Many of the largest firms are controlled by families.
3. The widely held corporation is most common in countries with good regimes of
shareholder protection.
4. Family control is more common in countries with poor shareholder protection.
5. State control is common, particularly in countries with poor shareholder protection.
6. In family controlled firms there is little separation between ownership and control.
7. Pyramids and deviations from one share-one vote are most common in countries with
poor shareholder protection.
8. Corporations with controlling shareholders rarely have other large shareholders.
Much of modern corporate governance theory has been premised on the Berle and Means
hypothesis of the separation of ownership and control.69 Berle and Means, writing at the
time of the first stock market crash, argued that as companies got larger their shareholdings
became diffused. In the resulting hiatus, management's power increased in significant power
blocks that required regulation by the courts or legislatures. Survey results show that we
need to be more diverse and flexible in formulating corporate models for the purpose of
devising corporate governance structures, particularly at an international level. It is neglect
of this fact that until recently has hampered the EU harmonization program. Corporate
governance necessarily reflects the corporate landscape in which it operates and we must
resist a tendency towards ethnocentrism, particularly one centered on the United States
simply because of its economic dominance. The United States has a number of path-
dependent characteristics that characterize its laws and are not easily exportable or neces-
sarily efficient.1° It is the economic efficiency of U.S. markets, not necessarily its legal
system, that should be emulated.
Nevertheless, the Southeast Asian Financial crisis has exposed the dark side of corporate
governance practices in some of the countries involved.7'1 Common features include complex
systems of family control and the existence of conglomerate structures that often defy eco-
nomic rationality; little or no effective standards to ensure that controlling shareholders
and management treat small investors properly; an absence of transparency and proper
auditing practices; inefficient and sometimes corrupt legal systems in some of the countries;
a lack of integrity in the regulatory processes (if they exist); and the absence of an indepen-
dent, proactive media. The notable exceptions are Singapore, Hong Kong, and to a lesser
extent, Taiwan and Malaysia.
It has been argued that sustained prosperity depends on the following basic rules: effective
standards of corporate governance; a high degree of corporate transparency and adequate
external auditing; efficient stock exchanges; competitive markets; efficient and transparent
legal frameworks; a clear distinction between regulators and regulated; independent, trans-
69. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1968).
See also MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995) for a more recent study.
70. See Mark Roe, Path Dependence, Political Options, and Governance Systems, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 165 (Klaus Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1997).
71. See MICHAEL BACKMAN, ASIAN ECLIPSE-ExPoSING THE DARK SIDE OF BUSINESS IN ASIA (1999). But cf
Richard Appelbaum, The Future of Law in a Global Economy, 1998 Soc. & LEGAL STUDIES 171 (arguing the
contrary).
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parent, and competitive banking systems; and a well-resourced, inquisitive, and independent
media.72 The Southeast Asian approach sowed the seeds of its own collapse.
IX. The Evolution of Modern Corporate Governance
and Its Place in a New Financial Architecture
Our early ideas of corporate governance were tied to national models. Thus, in a system
characterized by one-tier boards, it makes sense to talk about more independent directors.
In a system characterized by two-tier boards, the matter has been substantially created from
a different mechanism. Nevertheless, in the last twenty years we have seen the concept of
corporate governance extended beyond national models of corporate laws to encompass
systems of self regulation that differ in their degrees of rigor and formality. The matter can
be represented as follows:
Stock Exchange Listing Requirements
Statements of Accounting Practice




Corporate governance does not exist in a vacuum. Modern corporate governance is played
out in the context of expanding and increasingly sophisticated capital markets. Within these
markets, institutional investors are now major players in western countries and are diver-
sifying into international portfolios.
X. Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance
73
A. ExrENT
Institutional investors increased their market share of UK-listed equities from 17.9 per-
cent in 1957 to 60.4 percent in 1992, and are acquiring about two percent of the UK equity
72. Id. at 3.
73. See FARRAR, supra note 27, at 578 et seq. See also John C. Coffee Jr., Institutional Investors as Corporate
Monitors: Are Takeovers Obsolete, in TAKEOVERS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND THE MODERNIZATION OF COR-
P RATE LAWS ch. 2 Cohn H. Farrar ed., 1993) (for citation of the many U.S. law review articles on aspects of
this topic). See also GEOFF P. STAPLEDON, INSTITtrriONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1996);
Ian Ramsay et al., Institutional Investors' Views on Corporate Governance, Research Report, Centre for Corporate
Law and Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne (1998); Geoff Stapledon, The Duties of Australian
Institutional Investors in Relation to Corporate Governance, 26 AUSTRALIAN Bus. L. REv. 331 (1998); Hans Blom-
mestein, supra note 67.
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market each year.74 Institutions hold over sixty percent of listed loan capital. 75 These are
the highest international percentages but there are similar trends in Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, and the United States, although each country has its own distinctive history.16
These facts nevertheless potentially revolutionize the concept of corporate governance in
those English-speaking countries. Ownership is being regrouped, but until recently has
been relatively passive. The relationship between institutions and portfolio companies and
between institutions and their constituents is not uniform and is in fact quite complex in
those countries. 77 Whereas the separation of ownership from control is a relatively simple
movement, this further stage of a regrouping of ownership with the potential of control is
not so simple. Yet its impact on our understanding of the listed company and the conceptual
framework of company law is potentially profound. Hence one American writer, Paul Har-
brecht, referred to the "paraproprietal society."" Since Harbrecht's time there has been the
massive growth of institutional funds managers, which complicates the picture further.
B. REASONS FOR THE GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGS
The first and paramount reason for the growth of institutional holdings is the growth
since 1945 of pension and superannuation schemes. Originally in private pension plans,
pension obligations were satisfied by the purchase of annuities from life insurance com-
panies. Thus, the funds were included in the insurance companies' assets. Later, non-
insured plans became popular because of the possibility of the fund's investment in ordinary
shares. A second reason is the legislation in many countries that relaxed the trustee invest-
ments and allowed trustees to invest part of the trust funds in equities. A third reason is
the rise of insurance-linked investment schemes to take advantage of insurance tax relief in
some countries, although the modern tendency is to withdraw this relief to maintain a level
playing field. A fourth reason is the favorable tax treatment of insurance companies and
unit and investment trusts in some countries. A fifth reason is the deregulation of the
banking and securities industries since the early 1980s and the removal of exchange control
in a number of countries. Lastly, the effect of technological change and the change in
international communications has impacted the growth of institutional holdings.
It is noticeable that none of these reasons is company-oriented. In other words, the
company is simply the outlet for these investment urges. This, combined with the passivity
of institutions as shareholders, probably accounts for the fact that until the 1980s, such
investment caught the corporate world unaware and company lawyers failed to appreciate
its full significance. On the other hand, the collapse of the Maxwell empire and the scandals
74. See R.J. BRISTON & R. DOBBINS, THE GROWTH AND IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: A REPORT TO
THE RESEARCH COMMITFEE OF THE INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN WRIGLAND AND WALES 24
(1978); G.P. STAPLEDON, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1996).
75. Jerry Coakley & Laurence Harris, The City of Capital 106-7 (1983).
76. SeeJohn H. Farrar & M. Russell, The Impact ofInstitutional Investment on Company Law, 5 COMPANY LAW.
107 (1984); Coffee, supra note 73. See also AUSTRALIAN STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 17 (1998) for recentsurveys,
THOMAS CLARKE & STEWART CLEGG, CHANGING PARADIGMS-THE TRANSFORMATION OF MANAGEMENT KNOWL-
EDGE FOR THE 2 ' CENTURY 314 (1998). The percentage for United States was 46, Japan 45, Germany 29. In
Japan and Europe a significant percentage was held by non-financial enterprises.
77. See Farrar, supra note 76; STAPLEDON, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ,
supra note 73, at 239 et seq.
78. Pension Funds and Economic Power: The Paraproprietal Society, Preface to DANIEL J. BAUM & N.B. STILES,
THE SILENT PARTNERS: INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS & CORPORATE CONTROL (1965).
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surrounding use of pension fumds for corporate purposes have put the spotlight on this
legally complex area. This led to the Report of the UK Pensions Law Reform Committee,
chaired by Professor Roy Goode in 1993, which recommended a new Pensions Act and
system of regulation to impose order on the chaos.
C. THE PAST ELUSIVENESS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ROLE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
While the growth of institutional holdings and their potential power is well documented,
until the last decade there was little evidence that such power had been exercised in any
significant way. Commentators, therefore, hesitate to speak in terms of control, except
perhaps in the sense of constraint or power to monitor. 9
Nowadays, however, there is direct and indirect industry-wide and firm-level monitoring.
The direct monitoring is done by analysis of information and regular meetings and dialogue
with management. Indirect monitoring is done by investment committees as well as support
for non-executive directors.
In the United Kingdom, the two best documented cases of institutional intervention are
the Thalidomide and the Newman Industries cases. In the former, the management of
Distillers Company Ltd. foolishly resisted public pressure to settle on more generous terms
with the victims. In the end, the company's shares fell and the institutional investors to-
gether with the company's merchant banks met with senior management on January 4,
1973. Two days later, the company increased its offer from £3.24m to £21.75m, which
formed the basis of the ultimate settlement10 In the Newman Industries case,"' the Pru-
dential Assurance Co. Ltd. litigated in individual, representative, and derivative form as a
minority shareholder and the costs of the proceedings at the first instance were reported
to be £4 m. The case was appealed before being settled. The judgment of the Court of
Appeal was rather critical of the initiative's cost.
In numerous cases, institutional support has assisted a bidder in a takeover. The goal
here has been gain. In the United States, the Securities Exchange Commission's (SEC)
Institutional Investor Study Report" documented institutional involvement in transfers of
corporate control. The two main strategies that had been adopted were (1) purchase of
shares in anticipation of bid and (2) financial assistance to the bidder.83
Among the special inducements that they have received in return for advance information
about a bid were a higher price for their shares and assurances of contingent benefits if the
bid succeeded. In many countries, use of advance information may now be caught by the
insider trading provisions.
Dr. G. P. Stapledon, in Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance14 has docu-
mented eighteen areas of corporate governance where U.K. institutional investors or funds
managers have been active, usually behind the scenes. These cover a wide range of corporate
79. EDWARD J. HERM.N, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER (1981); Cf STAPLEDON, INSTITUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDERS & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 73, chs. 4, 5, 9, 10.
80. See P.I. BLUMBERG, THE MEGACORPORATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE POWER
134-5 (1975).
81. Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2) [1982] ch. 204, CA. See also Vinelott
J [1980] 3 WLR 543.
82. H. R. Doc. No. 92-64, pt. 5.
83. Id.
84. Id. at ch. 4.
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activity. Usually this monitoring takes the form of direct, firm-level monitoring and has
taken place through various committees and by the use of non-executive directors.
Nevertheless, the prevailing view hitherto has been that the primary responsibility of the
institutional investor is simply to achieve maximum investment performance. If this is not
present in a portfolio company, the rule has been to sell. This rule has two aspects-first,
it denies the existence of any duty to fellow shareholders and other groups such as employees
and consumers, and secondly, it maintains that, in any event, the overriding duty is to sell
rather than incur costs and further risks."
Institutional investors in the past have been worried about the political consequences of
an exercise of power. They eschew public criticism and fear public intervention. Some
consider that their expertise is finance and investment rather than management and this
does not necessarily equip them to pursue an interventionist role. They are also worried
about the risks involved. Lastly, they are reluctant to offend the companies in which they
invest. There may be more than one relationship between the company and institutions
and, in any event, the institutions continue to rely on the companies for current information
in spite of the new prohibitions on insider trading.
This conservatism of institutions in the exercise of power was criticized by Adolf Berle
Jr. in the following terms:
In effect, the position of the institutional managers is that they will not exercise their voting
power so as seriously to affect the choice or the policies of corporate managements. The
individuals for whom the institutions are fiduciaries, holders of rights in pension trust, of shares
in mutual funds, or of insurance policies, have surrendered their voting power. The institutional
managers, therefore, by their policy of non-intervention, merely insulate the corporate man-
agements from any possible action by or influence of the ultimate, beneficial 'owners' of the
stock. A policy of non-action by the institutions means that the directors and managements of
the corporations whose stock they hold become increasingly self-appointed and unchallenge-
able; while it continues, it freezes absolute power in the corporate management.86
D. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR INVOLVEMENT IN SELF REGULATION
In the last decade, institutional investors have become more organized and have pro-
moted law reform and the development of self regulation of corporate governance.8 7 Car-
olyn Brancato has identified five stages in U.S. institutional investor activism:
i) social responsibility investing;
ii) fighting anti-takeover initiatives;
iii) pressing for structural governance changes in portfolio companies;
iv) monitoring performance; and
v) incorporating non-financial performance issues into indicators of corporate perfor-
mances."8
Institutional investors are important shareholders and debt capital holders who are them-
selves subject to increased monitoring of their investment performance. Their ever-
85. See BLUMBERG, supra note 80, at 136.
86. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 55-56
(1960). See also Edward S. Herman & Carl F. Stafanda, Proxy Voting by Commercial Bank Trust Departments, 90
BANKING L. J. 91 (1973). Cf. STAPLEDON, supra note 73.
87. See CAROLYN K. BRANCATO, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ch. 3 (1997).
88. Id.
VOL. 33, NO. 4
THE NFA AND EFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 949
increasing holdings and increased competition for funds management give them powerful
incentives to take a more proactive role. On the other hand, their role is often subject to
fiduciary constraints and there is a potential clash between long-term and short-term ob-
jectives.
In the United States, Calpers has taken a leading role. Networks of institutional investors
and specialist advisory services have formed in the United States which facilitate institutions
exercising their voting duties and organizing coalitions on specific policies or issues. In the
United Kingdom, historically the Prudential Assurance Company has taken a leading role,
although not always with conspicuous success. Institutions have been active in the drafting
and operation of the City of London Takeover Code and in the Cadbury, Greenbury, and
Hampel Reports on Corporate Governance. In Australia, institutions have been represented
on the Bosch Committee, which produced Corporate Practices and Conduct, and the Australian
Investment Managers Association (now the Investment and Financial Services Association),
which produced guidelines s9 A criticism that is sometimes made about the self-regulation
so far evolving is that it concentrates on form rather than substance and emphasizes process
rather than the outcome.
A recent UK survey9 shows that "best practice" in corporate governance is generally
followed by institutional investors themselves with most companies having audit and re-
muneration committees, although the incidence of nomination committees is lower than
might be desired. Life assurance companies have the highest number of key board com-
mittees, while the retail bank sector has the highest proportion of non-executive directors.
There is frequent contact between international institutional investors and some degree of
cooperation.
E. NOT A UNIVERSAL PICTURE
So far we have concentrated on English-speaking countries. The question arises as to
whether this picture is universal. The answer, quite simply, is no.
Recent studies have shown that the role of institutional investor involvement in corporate
governance is relatively recent on the European continent.9I This is primarily due to struc-
tural factors. In many continental European countries, institutional investors are banks or
part of a banking group and subject to greater restrictions than institutional investors and
investment managers in the countries we have considered. 9
Also in countries like Germany, banks have played a different role in relation to shares
in listed companies. Their role has often been more closely involved with major companies
than their English-speaking counterparts due to complex factors including corporate net-
works. Japan has its own distinctive Keiretsu system where banks are caught up in a spider's
web of corporate networks. 93 Both of these factors inhibit shareholder activism and a proac-
tive role in reforming corporate governance.
89. See STAPLEDON, supra note 73; ROBERT MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1995).
90. See Chris Mallin, The Role of Institutional Investors in the Corporate Governance of Financial Institutions: The
UK Case, in BALLING, supra note 67, ch. X; Ramsay et al., supra note 73.
91. See Eddy Wymeersch, A Status Report on Corporate Governance Rules and Practices in Some Continental
European States, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH,
ch. 12 (d) (Klaws J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998).
92. See id. at 37.
93. See, e.g., KENICHI MIYASHITA & DAVID RUSSELL, KEIRETSU-INSIDE THE HIDDEN JAPANESE CONGLOM-
ERATES (1994).
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XI. The Recent Initiative of the OECD
In 1996, the Council of the OECD commissioned a study of corporate governance to
review and analyze international corporate governance issues and suggest an agenda and
priorities for further OECD initiatives. This led to the establishment of the Business Sector
Advisory Group on Corporate Governance, which produced a report, Corporate Gover-
nance: Improving Competitiveness and Access to Capital in Global Markets, in April 1998.
The chairman was Ira Millstein and the other members were Michel Albert, Sir Adrian
Cadbury, Robert Denham, Dieter Feddersen, and Nobuo Tateisi.94 The following were
identified as key areas of common understanding:
1. Corporate governance practices constantly evolve to meet changing conditions. There
is no single universal model of corporate governance. Nor is there a static, final struc-
ture in corporate governance that every country of corporation should emulate. Ex-
perimentation and variety should be expected and encouraged.
2. Corporate governance practices vary and will continue to vary across nations and
cultures. We can learn a great deal from observing experiences in other countries.
3. Corporate governance practices will also vary as a function of ownership structures,
business circumstances, competitive conditions, corporate life cycle, and numerous
other factors. 95 There are, however, a few fundamental parameters.
4. Increasingly, it is accepted that the corporate objective is maximizing shareholder
value, which not only requires superior competitive performance but also generally
requires responsiveness to demands and expectation of other stakeholders.
5. Increased transparency and independent oversight of management by boards of di-
rectors are the central elements of improved corporate governance.
6. Board practice should be subject to voluntary adaptation and evolution, in an envi-
ronment of globally understood minimum standards.
7. There are certain areas in which the adoption of universal rules is preferable (such as
in accounting).96
The committee recommended the following agenda:
1. The definition of the mission of the corporation and transparency about non-
economic objectives.
2. Adaptable corporate governance arrangements.
3. The protection of shareholder rights.
4. The facilitation of active investing.
5. The alignment of shareholder and other stakeholder interests.
6. The recognition of societal interests.97
As can be seen, (1), (5), and (6) are crucially vague and represent something of a political
agenda. The main corporate governance reports to date have addressed such issues as:
a. structure of the board and board committees and, in particular, the role of non-
executive directors;
94. Corporate Governance: Improving Competitiveness and Access to Capital in Global Markets, A Report to the
OECD by the Business Sector Advisory Group on Corporate Governance, OECD Paris (Mar. 3, 1998).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 9$ 8 et seq.
97. Id. at T 16 et seq.
VOL. 33, NO. 4
THE NFA AND EFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 951
b. Directors' remuneration;
c. The conduct of general meetings and managing shareholder relations; and
d. The role of institutional investors.
The committee set out perspectives for public policy improvement.9 This is character-
ized by:
1. Flexibility;
2. Consideration of regulatory impact; and





The report also refers to clarity, consistency, and enforceability and stresses the need for
accurate and timely disclosure and protection against litigation abuse, corruption, and brib-
ery. It calls for flexible corporate laws and securities regulation that clearly specified man-
agement's responsibilities and protectd shareholder rights. Policy makers should encourage
some degree of independence in the composition of company boards, sound audit practices,
and a level playing field for institutional investors to ensure competition.9 Individual cor-
porations should continue to strive for corporate governance "best practices."'oo
The report favored further OECD efforts:1oI
1. To formulate a public policy document setting out minimum standards of corporate
governance;
2. To formulate a code of voluntary "best practice;" and
3. To encourage common principles of disclosure.
The report was followed recently by the formulation of draft principles. The principles
fall under five broad headings: °2
1. The right of shareholders;
2. The equitable treatment of shareholders;
3. The role of shareholders;
4. Disclosure and transparency; and
5. The role of the board.
The principles are built upon the foundations of shareholder protection and the residual
monitoring role of shareholders. Therefore, minimal shareholder protection is envisaged
to protect participation and exit rights. Exercise of voting rights is encouraged.
Fair treatment of shareholders is required. In particular, self-dealing and insider trading
are to be prohibited.
98. Id. at 19-23.
99. Id. at 128.
100. Id. at 36. See Michael A. Almond & Scott D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance: Cormption, Corporate Respon-
sibility and Ethical Standards in the New Global Economy, 22 N. C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 389 (1997).
101. Id.
102. See the OECD website for the latest version of the draft (visited Oct. 4, 1999) <http://www.oecd.
org//daf/govemance/principles.htm >.
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The discussion of stakeholders is well meaning but necessarily vague. They have a place
but not necessarily legal rights. Disclosure is axiomatic and should be timely and accurate
and subject to annual independent audit.
The role of the board is similarly crucial, but the OECD countries have diverse structures
and practices. Nevertheless, the board's accountability is basic. Various board responsibili-
ties are discussed including overriding duties to act fairly between different groups of share-
holders and stakeholders and to assure compliance with the law.
The principles went before a meeting of ministers on May 26 and 27, 1999, and were
adopted. It was envisaged that there will be intensive collaboration with non-member coun-
tries and cooperation with other international organizations, in particular the World Bank.
In fact, a Memorandum of Understanding was entered into in June between the OECD
and World Bank to cooperate by setting up a Global Corporate Governance Forum and
World Bank/OECD Policy Dialogue and Development. The Memorandum of Under-
standing states that:
The World Bank and the OECD will sponsor the Global Corporate Governance Forum, which
will consist of regional development banks and other international organisations and groupings
such as APEC, IASC, IOSCO, IMF, Commonwealth Association, private sector participants
and institutions as well as donor and developing/transition countries. The Global Corporate
Governance Forum will ordinarily meet once a year. It will approve the objectives, policies,
and monitoring of the Forum's Secretariat. It will also review the annual work program and
the financial plan, as proposed by the Secretariat, with the support of the Private Sector Ad-
visory Group ... The Global Corporate Forum will consult with representatives of non-
governmental organisations and stakeholder groups with a specific interest in corporate gov-
ernance.
03
In addition, the Corporate Governance Private Sector Advisory Group and network of
Round Tables have now been set up jointly with the World Bank. In a speech given at Seoul,
Korea, on March 3, 1999, Ms. Joanna Shelton, Deputy Secretary General of the OECD
said:
The OECD Principles could be just one part of a wider dialogue on various aspects of corporate
governance, in workshops or conferences that would be organised on a regional basis or pos-
sibly in some other ways. We are very open-minded as to the ways in which further dialogue
with countries beyond the OECD membership might proceed. Whatever form this co-
operation may take, strengthening the corporate governance framework in countries around
the world is now recognised as one key element in laying a strong foundation for the resump-
tion of economic growth in Asia and elsewhere and for a more stable international economic
system. 1"
The recent announcements clearly envisage the OECD and World Bank playing a lead-
ing role in developing norms of international corporate governance. As with the OECD's
Guidelines on Multinationals, such initiative is to be welcomed but the matter needs to be
promoted by other international bodies such as IMF and the WTO because of their broader
103. The full text of the Memorandum of Understanding is available at OECD Online (visited Nov. 11,
1999) <http://www.oecd.org//daf/corporate-affairs/governance/oecd-wb-mou.htm>.
104. Joanna R. Shelton, The Importance of Corporate Governance in OECD and non-OECD Economies, The Draft
OECD Principles, Opening Remarks at the Conference on Corporate Governance in Asia: A Comparative Perspective
(Mar. 3, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org/news-and-events/release/sheltonseoul.htm>.
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base. As we have seen, the WTO has been suggested for the supervisory role in the new
global financial architecture.'0 5
XII. The Contribution of Global Corporate Governance
to New Financial Architecture
To sum up, the primary goals of global corporate governance are to promote: (1) trans-
parency in commercial dealings and financial transactions especially fund raising; (2) ac-
countability through more efficient monitoring of management performance; and (3) com-
petition.
Given the present state of a diversity of models of corporate governance reflected in
national laws, which may gradually diminish with the growth of regionalism and the impact
of globalization, there is much to be said for the development of voluntary international
corporate governance norms based on an emerging consensus. This can mirror the work
already done with respect to international accounting standards.
Sir Ronald Hampel who chaired one of the recent UK committees has said: "I believe
an umbrella set of governance principles internationally would be helpful, within which it
would be possible for national environments and companies to develop detailed governance
structures appropriate to their circumstances. " 1 0
The advantages of this approach are: (1) it is evolutionary; (2) it is more flexible than a
more elaborate attempt at harmonization of laws on a regional basis; (3) it transcends the
nation- state and regions and is evolved by the industry (using that term in a broad sense);
(4) it recognizes that global convergence is not necessarily inevitable and that there is an
absence of an appropriate international organization to promote harmonization or uniform
laws. The United Nations has failed in its Code of Conduct for Transnational Enterprise.
The OECD has been more successful but its membership is limited and somewhat eclectic.
The dangers of this kind of approach lie in: (1) the dominance of the debate by financial
institutions in the West and its consequent ethnocentrism; 7 (2) the lack of effective en-
forcement mechanism; (3) the tendency to concentrate on form rather than substance and
process rather than outcome; and (4) the tendency to pursue fashions without any consid-
eration of their efficiency in practice.
We live in a period of complex transition characterized by rapid change and it is difficult
to monitor the effects of this change on the existing world order. There are two distinct
schools of thought about an appropriate approach to dealing with this. One is a regulatory
approach-a projection of national regulation into the international arena. The other is a
free-market approach-to leave the development to market forces.10s The evolution of
norms of self-regulation of international corporate governance from initiatives such as the
105. See Ebert, supra note 2.
106. COMPANY DIRECTOR (Australia), Feb. 1999, at 16.
107. For an interesting recent discussion of an attempt to export U.S. Corporate Governance ideas to
Germany, see Thomas Andre, Jr., Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance
Ideologies to Germany, 73 TUL. L. REv. 69 (1998).
108. See Grundfest, supra note 3.
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OECD's Principles represents a possible middle way-a non-legal soft law °9 that can form
the basis of a lex mercatorial ' ° of this area. The Romans said "Via media, via tuta"-the
middle way is the safe way.
At the present stage of development, to use the language of Jack Nicholson in a recent
film, "this is as good as it gets."
109. For a distinction between hard and soft law and legal and non-legal soft law, see C. M. Chinkin, The
Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 850, 851 (1989).
110. See Hans-Joachim Mertens, Lex Mercatoria: A Self Applying System Beyond National Law?, in GLOBAL
LAW WITHOUT A STATE ch.2 (G. Teubner ed., 1997).
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